
Hoodies & Hoodlums

A Match Made in (Heaven | Hell)?

But first ..




- Complex, multi-faceted topic
 - Criminology, sociology,
 economics, geopolitics, ...
- I'm *not* law enforcement
 - I'm already sorry for causing physical pain



But first ..



- Complex, multi-faceted topic
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A long road to the silk road

- "Silk Road" was the first modern "Darknet Market"
 - Marihuana via ARPANET (1970!)
 - Proto-Silkroad: The Farmer's Market (2006)
- Beginning media attention:
 - "Drug dealers are using the Internet!1!!"
 - "The Mafia uses the Internet!11!!"
 - "The Mafia is taking over cybercrime!11"



Organized Controlled Crime

- "Group that seeks to contol a local criminal market"
 - "What is Organized Crime?" Federico Varese, 2010/2017
- "Organised" means "Controlled"
 - "What Is the Business of Organized Crime?" Thomas C. Schelling, 1971
- Governance is a deciding factor

Cybercrime is a criminal market

- Similarities to "analog" crime
 - Products (Drugs / Malware), services (Targeted theft / DDoS)
 - Structures of varying levels of organization
- Differences to "analog" crime
 - Few to no local context in the typical sense
 - Usually little overlap in the core business of either


Taking over? Yeah, no.

- No local context makes governance hard
 - Disclaimer: There are a few exceptions
- Little incentive for organised crime to attempt to take over
 - Missing "locality" makes control more difficult
- A lot of incentives for cybercrime to stay clear
 - Violence isn't exactly a pull factor

Working together? Yeah.

- Transaction-based cooperation often times makes sense
- Both sides offer services that can be helpful
 - Enabling services, e.g. money muling
 - Supporting services, e.g. "hacking for hire"

How does that look in practice?



2021 wasn't a good year for organised crime

- March: Raids and arrests in multiple countries, especially BE and NL
- Confiscation of close to 20 tons of cocaine, several millions in cash and assets
- Second time in less than a year where criminals were hit in unexpected ways

Sky ECC aka "NoThInG iS mOrE sEcUrE"

- Encrypted communication based on modified smartphones
 - 6.000 customers in BE, 12.000 in NL
 - Around half of the BE-devices were used in the vicinity of the Antwerp port
- Around 1 billion messages, half of them decrypted

7MIOBC [She] also asked me how long the USB be plugged in


De Valk:

7MIOBC

And afterthat you can access that pc we that we infected or multiple pc's

De Valk:

I have to start there and then I will map the network. Then I have to find the main server there and get all the admin passwords. those passwords are hashed, I have to decrypt them with amazon cloud. can take up to a week



De Valk: then they can pick up the stick from me

De Valk:

alright I will make it tomorrow it will be ready the day after tomorrow i will put the windows on my system.

De Valk: put it and test it so it works.

De Valk:

once I have admin password then I give myself system privileges and then I delete logs

> De Valk: as long as I don't do anything they won't see anything

> > De Valk: Crazy

De Valk: don't worry I have been doing this for many years

"Hackers" hacking .. port terminals


- Utmost basic level of technical complexity
 - Off-the-shelf malware, mostly via thumbdrive
- Enabling the offering of criminal services
 - Support with avoiding customs inspections
 - Theft of container PIN
 - "Full container service"

Criminal symbiosis

- Massive simplification for smugglers
 - No need for local help
- Low-effort income for cybercriminals
 - One successful run? 500.000 Euros

Challenges

- 2022: 160 tons of confiscated cocaine in Rotterdam alone
 - Amount of containers inspected? Far below 5%
- Modern ports are designed for efficiency, not security
 - Which seems to apply to the IT environment as well ...
- Even minimal undermining hurts



Prescription fraud

- Primarily in the USA, Canada
 - First, so far isolated cases in DE, maybe NL and CZ
- Professionalization akin to Ransomware
 - Access through access brokers
 - Fraudulent issuing of valid prescriptions
 - Street level dealing by established perpetrators

Criminal symbiosis


- Simplification for dealers
 - No reliance on potentially shaky helpers
- Simple, easy income for cybercriminals
 - Different ballgame than retail drug smuggling, but still good
- Minimizing risks for both sides

Challenges

- Pharmacies are barely able to detect the fraud
 - Fun fact: "Too legible handwriting" used to be an indication for fraud
- Law enforcement loses important information
 - A plethora of digital systems makes investigations more challenging
 - The chances of an "insider" struggling with their consciousness decreases

III: Theft





[TLP:RED]

- - Incident is handled by MSP
- Attackers not following "the script"
- A few weeks later: Significant theft
 - Perpetrators

(Probably / Obviously) just the tip of the iceberg

- Money laundering
- (RUMINT) Car theft
- There's (much) more:
 - Cooperation between cybercrime, organised crime, state entities

TL;DR

- Cooperation between cybercrime and organised crime not just drug-related
- Media coverage about this often lurid and of questionable nature
- The "takeover" of cybercrime by "the mafia" is a boogeyman
 - However: Intensified case-by-case cooperation
- IT-security tends to not be included in "offline" threat assessments big mistake!

Thank you for your attention

- >>>>>>>>>

Questions?