Understanding the Russian Way of Deterrence
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, deterrence has stood as one of the central pillars in international security policy. Initially conceptualized in the West to prevent total war through mutual threat of retaliation, ..
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, deterrence has stood as one of the central pillars in international security policy. Initially conceptualized in the West to prevent total war through mutual threat of retaliation, deterrence has evolved over time, branching into a variety of forms (from nuclear to conventional, from high-intensity to more subtle "hybrid" measures.
Underlying these developments is the recognition that each state's deterrence posture is profoundly shaped by its strategic culture: the inherited historical experiences, deeply held beliefs, and institutional practices through which national security elites understand and employ military force.
Over the last two decades, Russia's approach to coercion and war, what Dmitry Adamsky calls the "Russian Way of Deterrence", has become a subject of intense debate and scrutiny, especially in light of Moscow's .. let's call it rather assertive foreign policies (aka "overt military actions").
The Kremlin's integration of nuclear, conventional, cyber, and informational instruments has blurred the lines between peace and conflict, revealing a flexible, multi-domain strategy when it comes to trying to get what they want.
A lot of understanding of deterrence theory is based on a very Westernized point of view, which ensures that we fall short of truly understanding how Moscow approaches deterrence. Understanding the distinctively Russian approach is, in my opinion, vital. Not only to shed light on what Moscow is doing, but also to craft effective responses that reduce escalation risks while safeguarding collective security.
In this post I'm trying to examine the genealogy, cultural roots, operational logic, outcomes, and future trajectory of the the Russian approach to deterrence, highlighting how it diverges from Western models. I'm hoping to help people understand how Russian strategic culture influences the Kremlin's approach to coercion, why that approach has developed in distinct ways, and how we can better understand and respond to Russia's deterrence posture.
Ultimately, I'd argue that acknowledging Russia’s unique worldview and strategic priorities is not an act of concession, but an essential step toward avoiding miscalculations and towards ensuring that our democracies remain able to defend themselves as effectively as possible.
Strategic Culture? Deterrence?
Strategic Culture refers to the influence of a nation's historical experience, values, and institutions on its security strategy and military behavior. The concept was first articulated during the Cold War by Professor Jack Snyder, who in 1977 defined strategic culture as ..
sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior
that a country's strategic community shares regarding the use of force. In essence, strategic culture integrates cultural factors and collective historical memory into analysis of how states perceive threats and use military power.
This perspective emerged partly as a reaction to the early Cold War's purely rationalist deterrence models, which treated states as homogeneous rational actors. Snyder and others argued that each state's unique experiences and narratives (its "historical baggage of accumulated experiences, beliefs, cultural influences and geographic and material limitations") shape its strategic preferences.
While strategic culture is not static or all-determining, it provides an important context for why different nations may approach security challenges in distinct ways.
Deterrence, as it is defined in classical strategic theory, is the practice of discouraging an opponent from taking unwanted action by threatening punitive response. A paper by RAND defines "deterrence" in simpler terms, as "dissuasion by means of threat". A state may deter an adversary by threatening to inflict severe punishment or by denying the adversary's objectives.
Classic deterrence theory was developed in the early nuclear era, concentrating on how rational actors calculate costs and benefits of aggression, all with the ultimate goal of avoiding a nuclear Armageddon that would end human life as we know it.
Academia distinguishes between several "types" of deterrence:
- Deterrence by punishment - the threat of massive retaliation in order to inflict unacceptable damage to an aggressor
- Deterrence by denial - reducing the enemy's probability of success in order to keep them from assuming the role of an aggressor in the first place
- General deterrence - the long-term maintenance of credible threats to prevent aggression before it even starts
- Immediate deterrence - the seeking of stopping an imminent attack during a crisis
Deterrence became a central pillar of Cold War security policies once nuclear weapons made total war potentially catastrophic. It was long treated as a universal, almost mechanical logic: if each side is rational and understands the other's credible threats, war can be avoided. However, with the rise of strategic culture studies, analysts came to realize that perceptions of credible threat are not uniform across different countries.
Strategic culture "conditions the conceptualization and practice of coercion", meaning states may practice deterrence differently based on their unique worldviews. What convinces one adversary might not have the same effect on another due to differing historical analogies, ideologies, or risk tolerances.
Michael Kofman observes that "two strategic communities can look at the same situation but come to different conclusions" about military threats, technologies, and likely outcomes. Recognizing these differences is crucial to avoid mirror-imaging and miscommunication in deterrence relationships.
There is a quite rich body of historical scholarship on strategic culture and deterrence. After pioneering work on Soviet strategic culture, a (for lack of a better word) "first generation" of scholars in the 1980s (e.g. Colin Gray, Ken Booth, David Jones) compared U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies, attributing differences to factors like political ideology, historical experience, and geography. During the 1990s, a second wave of research attempted more rigorous analysis of how strategic culture constrains or channels policy choices over time.
By the 2000s and 2010s, interest in cultural lenses had broadened beyond the U.S.-Soviet dyad, examining how countries like China, India, Iran, and Russia (in its post-Soviet incarnation) possessed distinct strategic cultures affecting their deterrence behavior. Meanwhile, deterrence theory itself has evolved to address new contexts such as regional conflicts, terrorism, cyberspace, and multi-polar rivalries. Contemporary deterrence scholarship often emphasizes tailored deterrence (adapting threats to a specific adversary's values and fears), an idea that implicitly draws on strategic culture insights. I haven't read it yet myself, but this lengthy paper on tailored deterrence by the USAF Counterproliferation Center has been recommended to me emphatically.
"Genealogical" origin of "Deterrence à la Russe"
While modern Russia's approach to deterrence has deep roots in Soviet military history it's at the same time a deliberate adaption, even a late convergence, with Western deterrence theory. Indeed, Russian deterrence scholarship is several decades younger than its Western equivalent.
During the Soviet era, especially under Stalin and Khrushchev, the mainstream Soviet view rejected Western notions of limited nuclear war .. of limited anything when it comes to warfare, really. The reason for that can be found in Marxist-Leninist ideology, which cast war as a class struggle that is inevitable and which has to be won - which is why Soviet military doctrine emphasized war-fighting capabilities over comparatively abstract deterrence theory.
As a result, classical deterrence theory found little resonance throughout most of Soviet strategic thought. Only after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the achievement of nuclear parity did Soviet leaders somewhat open up to the idea that the primary purpose of nuclear forces was to prevent war rather than to fight one.
By the time of Brezhnev's tenure in the 1970s, the USSR publicly acknowledged concepts akin to deterrence - by, for example, declaring a doctrine of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons in 1982, to signal that it sought to avoid nuclear conflict.
Still, Soviet writings tended to speak of "containment" and strategic stability rather than explicit "deterrence" as Western analysts understood it, but it was a "start" of sorts. The evolution of Russian deterrence thinking can be traced through distinct periods:
- 1954 - 1959: During this period, the successful acquisition of nuclear weapons was transformative for the Soviet Union. The atomic and hydrogen bomb tests gave Moscow a newfound ability to threaten devastating retaliation, which in turn prompted the beginning of a shift in Soviet perspectives on war and diplomacy.
While Stalin had largely viewed nuclear weapons as "just bigger bombs" for use if war came, his successors realized that these weapons imposed caution in both sides. The late 1950s saw Soviet leaders to begin to signal the horrendous costs of nuclear war in hopes of dissuading adversaries - essentially practicing deterrence even if they did not call it that;. - 1960s - 1970s: This period was characterized by a frantic nuclear arms race and a major restructuring of Soviet forces to integrate nuclear missiles as a core element. During this time, both global superpowers amassed large arsenals. The Soviets built up their strategic rocket forces and air defenses, striving to balance the U.S. capability and ensure a credible retaliatory threat.
Implicitly, mutual deterrence - through mutually assured destruction - took hold. By the late 1960s, each side knew an attack on the other would invite catastrophic reprisals. Soviet writings slowly began to reflect this reality, discussing the importance of maintaining the correlation of forces at a level that dissuaded NATO from contemplating aggression, for example.
However, the USSR still invested in war-fighting plans (e.g. nuclear artillery and theater nuclear options in Europe), reflecting some skepticism that "assured destruction" alone would suffice as guarantor for peace.
1970s - 1991: During this period the Soviet Union achieved their goal of approximate nuclear parity with the United States and accordingly came to view strategic nuclear weapons primarily as deterrent tools rather than battlefield weapons.
By this time, both superpowers recognized that an all-out nuclear war would be suicidal, not just for each other but potentially (if not likely) the planet as a whole. This understanding underpinned arms control treaties like SALT and the ABM Treaty.
Soviet military journals increasingly framed nuclear forces a serving to "restrain imperialist aggression" (you could even say that the goal was to "deter" them), and that the maintenance of huge nuclear capabilities was necessary in order to continue to prevent war through strength.
Notably, in this period Soviet thinkers thoroughly rejected Western theories of limited nuclear war or coercive nuclear strikes, considering them "destabilizing and immoral". Similar disdain was applied to "extended deterrence", the threat to use nuclear weapons on behalf of allies. Instead, the Kremlin relied on the sheer scale of its arsenal to convince any foe that an attack on the USSR would never succeed.
By the end of the Cold War, deterrence was an implicit (but oddly enough not explicit) cornerstone of Soviet Strategy.
- 1991 - 2000: The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a turning point and the start of a period in which the newly formed Russian Federation grappled with its conventional military weakness and this leaned more heavily on nuclear deterrence.
Russia's economy and military were in disarray throughout the 1990s, while the conventional superiority of NATO forces became more and more apparent - especially after the U.S.-led victory in the 1991 Gulf War and NATO's high-tech air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.
Russian analysts grew increasingly anxious about their inability to stop a large-scale conventional invasion with depleted conventional means. It is during this time that the concept of "de-escalation" by limited nuclear use was first introduced. Around the year 2000, Moscow drafted a new military doctrine whose "main innovation was the concept of 'de-escalation' - the idea that, if Russia were faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its capacity for defense, it might respond with a limited nuclear strike.
The goal of such a strike would be to shock the adversary into backing down, effectively escalating a conflict in order to de-escalate it on terms favorable to Russia. Those of you who can see (non-nuclear) parallels to how Russia is behaving in their war against Ukraine, even after the full-scale invasion of February 2022, are very much in the right.
This doctrine was a direct response to Russia's conventional inferiority at the time and was influenced by observing NATO interventions. According to one account, the Russian leadership watched NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia with alarm, fearing that Moscow could face a similar Western onslaught and thus concluding that a credible nuclear "firebreak" was needed to deter Western powers from encroaching on Russia's vital interests. In short, after the fall of the Soviet Union Russia explicitly adopted nuclear deterrence and even limited nuclear war-fighting as a compensatory strategy to deter stronger conventional foes.
The 2000 Russian Military Doctrine thus lowered the threshold for nuclear use, envisioning limited nuclear strikes to stave off defeat in a major conventional war. Although Russias has, so far, never (seriously, pundits screaming at microphones don't count) publicly invoked the de-escalation option in a specific conflict, observers believe that this policy "probably limited the West's option for responding to the 2008 war in Georgia" and has weighed on NATO's mind on the war in Ukraine as well - and not just NATO. At times it feels like the Kremlin has successfully pavlov'd the West into becoming scared shitless the moment they rattle their nuclear sabre just a tiny bit (something that I have written about in the past).
- 2000s - 2010s: Improvements in Russian military capabilities throughout this time period also lead to a renaissance in Russian strategic thought. Buoyed by economic recovery and reforms under Vladimir Putin, Russia's conventional capabilities began to rebound after 2008, which established a basis that allowed for a broadcer conception of deterrence.
Russian military thinkers during this time shifted attention to what they termed "strategic deterrence", meaning a spectrum of both nuclear and non-nuclear means to deter a wide range of threats.
The Russian Armed Forces sought to integrate high-precision conventional weapons, missile defenses and even non-military tools into a unified deterrence framework. By the mid-2010s, Russia had developed conventionally armed balistic and cruise millies (such as, for example, the Iskander-M and Kalibr systems) that could reach regional targets with (at least some level of) precision.
These were seen by Moscow as options for non-nuclear kinetic deterrence, whereby it could threaten painful conventional strikes against adversary targets as an alternative or complement to nuclear retaliation. In parallel, Russia invested heavily in its strategic nuclear triad, in order to modernize all three legs of it, in order to maintain nuclear credibility against NATO.
A key development in Russian strategic thinking during this time was the recognition of "cross-domain deterrence", the idea that deterrence is not confied to the nuclear realm, but can encompass cyber operations, electronic warfare, space, and information operations as well.
During this period, Russian doctrine also began to highlight preventive and preemtpive measures short of war, aiming to shape a potential adversary's calculations well before a crisis reaches the threshold of open kinetic conflict in the Clausewitz-ian sense, or even nuclear war.
Notice the correlation of the time of the rising popularity of these concepts and approaches within the Russian military community and the increase in activities that "the West" considered "hybrid warfare" - signifying once more the basic difference in conceptual understanding of "deterrence" between Russia and "the West".
By the end of the 2010s, Russia's deterrence playbook had expanded significantly beyond the simple nuclear-vs-conventional dichotomy, reflecting what one analyst pointedly called a "holistic concept for shaping adversary decision making by integrating military and non-military measures". - 2010s - 2020s: This period, which is ongoing, can be described as the era of "hybrid strategic deterrence". Russian strategists introduced this term as they recognized the limitations of nuclear deterrence alone and finally adopted the concept of "cross-domain deterrence" that they first explored a few years prior.
In practice it's an intentional blurring of the line between war and peace as well as between deterrence and compellence. By wielding an array of implicit an explicit tools - diplomatic signals, economic leverage (shoutout to people who thought it would not become an issue to depend on Russian oil and gas), cyber attacks, deployment of proxy forces, information campaigns as well as conventional and nuclear forces - the goal is to induce fear in oppoinents in order to shape their behaviour without having to escalate to a full-scale war.
A 2017 Russian strategic document enumerated a spectrum of capabilities for continuous employment in peacetime and wartime – from non-military means (political influence operations, economic pressure) on one end, up through non-nuclear military options (precision strikes, conventional force movements), and nuclear forces at the extreme end.
Notably, Russian analysts argue that this integrated approach was partly learned from observing Western practices. They argue that the West also used information warfare and precision strikes (for example in Africa and the Middle East), and that Russia has "learned this approach" and adapted it.
However, what distinguishes the Russian approach is an even greater emphasis on credible threats of force. In other words, Moscow wraps a host of non-kinetic pressure tactice around a core of hard military power that it signals a willigness to use if pushed.
This hybrid deterrence philosophy has been on display in recent crises. For instance, since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, the Kremlin conducted nuclear force drills and issued thinly veiled nuclear warnings to NATO to deter any attempt at direct intervention. Simultaneously, it engaged in cyberattacks and energy politics to coerce Ukraine and European states. Such blending of methods is characteristic of the current Russian way of deterrence.
In sum, the genealogy of the Russian way of deterrence shows an evolution from Soviet rejection of Western deterrence concepts, to a grudging Cold War acceptance of mutual nuclear deterrence, to a post-Cold War innovation of new deterrence strategies tailored to Russia's specific circumstances after the fall of the Soviet Union - times that were a crucial reflection point, because Russia for the first time openly embraced deterrence theory (particularly nuclear deterrence) to compensate for conventional weaknesses.
From the 2000s onward, Russian defense intellectuals rapidly caught up on Western strategic thought and then began to develop a unique and, especially for Russia, innovative theory of coercion. According to Western experts, since the Soviet collapse Russia has bridged the knowledge gap with the West on deterrence and even pushed the envelope in certain areas.
The result by the 2020s is a Russian deterrence strategy that is broader in scope and more action-based than the classical Western models. Where Western doctrine often treats deterrence as separate from warfigthing (instead focusing on pre-war prevention), Russian doctrine uses "deterrence" as an umbrella term encompassing efforts to maintain or alter the status quo, to prevent the escalation of or to de-escalate a conflict, and even to shape the strategic environment during hostilities.
Furthermore, the Russian approach to deterrence relies not just on rhetorical threats but on concrete demonstrations, such as calibrated uses of force and resolve, as necessary conditions for shaping a situation of coercion. In order to better understand this singular approach Russia is taking today I want to examine it through the lens of cultural influences. As we can conclude from looking at history, Russia's unique path was neither linear nor simply imitative of the West. Instead, it was shaped by distinctive national factors and purposeful adaption over time.
History, Culture, Society - Background of the Russian Way of Deterrence
In his book about the Russian way of deterrence, Dmitry Adamsky says that the singular traits of deterrence à la Russe "emanate from Russian strategic culture, national mentality, military customs, and intelligence traditions", all of which have conditioned how Russian strategists think about coercion.
Russia's history as a continental empire that endured repeated invasions has instilled a strategic culture emphasizing vigilance, resilience, and the need to secure buffer zones.
From the Mongol invasions to the destructive occupations by Napoleon in 1812 and Nazi Germany in 1941, Russian collective memory is replete with trauma of being attacked from the West and other directions. This has bred a certain "siege mentality", a perception of Russia as a fortress under perpetual threat, which in turn fosters a coercive style aimed at scaring off potential aggressors.
For example, Russian leaders have historically been willing to incur massive sacrifices in war (as in the "Great Patriotic War" of 1941 - 1945) to ultimately deter and defeat invaders. This cultural experience translates into modern deterrence thinking that places high value on imposing costs and demonstrating resolve. Russian strategic culture tends to believe in deterrence by fear inducement, assuming that convincing an opponent of Russia's sheer toughness, military capabilities and willingness to escalate will keep conflict at bay.
This mindset can be contrasted with Western, especially U.S., strategic culture, which often emphasizes deterrence by denial (e.g. technological defense systems).
A CNA study abstract notes that "Russian strategic culture emphasizes cost imposition over denial for deterrence purposes", reflecting a belief in calibrated punishment as means to manage escalation. This cost-imposing inclination is rooted in historical lessons - Russians learned that only by inflicting and withstanding great pain (e.g. burning Moscow against Napoleon) could they prevail.
Thus, today's Russian way of deterrence (and fighting open wars) is comfortable with relatively high risk and high pain thresholds - threatening extreme measures, and enduring sanctions or isolation - as long as it promises to change an adversary's calculus.
Geography reinforces this. Russia's vast territory mostly lacks clear natural defenses, so forward defense and intimidation of neighbors have been traditional security strategies. The desire for strategic depth has culture resonance, meaning Moscow seeks to deter threats as far from its core as possible (by, for example, dominating its near abroad). This partly explains the emphasis on "demonstration" periods of escalation management in Russian doctrine. Early shows of force on the periphery are meant to warn enemies off before they reach Russia's borders - shows of forces that Moscow, if necessary, is more than willing to conduct on somebody else's land.
It's not just geography and history though. Russia's approach to deterrence is also shaped by concepts developed in Soviet military science, most notably a tradition of deception, psychological operations, and analytical planning that differs from Western methods. One such concept is called "Maskirovka", which was a core part of Soviet operational art and remains integral to Russian strategy.
The refined Soviet practice of "Reflexive Control", the idea of influencing an adversary's decision-making process by feeding them information that leads them to "choose" a course of action favorable to you, is especially relevant. As defined by a Soviet theorist, reflexive control means manipulating an opponent's perceptions so that they unwittingly make the decision you want them to make.
This concept has been studied in the Soviet Union (and, consequently, Russia) for decades and is essentially a form of coercive persuasion. It aligns closely with deterrence in that it seeks to alter the opponent's behavior without having to physically destroy them, but by shaping their view of reality.
The Russian strategic community has incorporated reflexive control techniques as a vital part into its deterrence toolkit. For example, prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow engaged in numerous information operations, arguably to "predetermine" Western responses and deter interference.
The long standing cultural emphasis on cunning, surprise, and psychological manipulation underpins Russia's way of deterrence. Unlike the straightforward "deterrence by transparency" approach some Western strategists favor, Russian practice often involves deliberate ambiguity and feints to keep adversaries uncertain and cautious. This can be seen in how Russian officials issue vague but menacing statements, such as hinting at nuclear use without explicit conditions, forcing opponents to err on the side of caution.
While this increases the risk of miscalculation, it aligns with a strategic culture comfortable with operational deceit as as norm in warfare. In sum, Soviet-era concepts of "active measures" and deception have evolved into modern techniques for coercion short of open conflict.
Another conceptual influence is the Soviet / Russian focus on damage infliction as a calibrated instrument. Western deterrence theory often modeled threats in abstract terms (e.g. "unacceptable damage" defined by population loss or economic destruction). Russian military through, by contrast, talks about "dosed" or "adequate" damage, carefully calculated strikes to send a message.
The idea of controlling escalation by phases, "periods of demonstration, adequate damage infliction, and retaliation", comes from Soviet military planning for theater warfare. Essentially, the Russian approach is to apply deterrent force in graduated steps, stopping short of total war if possible.
This reflects a cultural preference for gradual escalation and testing of the adversary's will. It also shows the influence of Soviet operational planning, which was very methodical about phases of conflict. By breaking deterrence and coercion into states, Russian strategists believe they can better manage the opponent's psychology, given them chances to reconsider at each state. This is somewhat different from the more binary "all or nothing" images of Armageddon that characterized early Western deterrence discourse.
Ironically enough, Western deterrence theory itself has become a source for Russian strategists. After the Soviet Union fell, there was a remarkable amount of cross-pollination. Russian defense scholars avidly read absorbed decades worth of Western nuclear strategy and deterrence literature.
In the 1990s and 2000s, while Western academia turned to other topics, Russian military academies earnestly studied Cold War-era Western theorists. They dissected works by Schelling, Kahn, Jervis, and others, translating concepts into Russian strategic language. his intellectual import helped Russia “bridge the gap” in deterrence scholarship and even leap ahead in certain niches.
For instance, the Russian strategic community embraced the notion of tailored deterrence and arguably practiced it more thoroughly than many Western states. Russian experts often discuss the need to consider the adversary's own strategic culture and values when crafting threats.
In other words, they attempt to do unto others as they believe others will respond. A senior U.S. analyst notes that while Western planners conceptually accept tailoring deterrence, in practice they often reduce it to technical factors (capabilities, force posture). Russian planners, by contrast, have shown a keen interest in the psychological makeup of their opponents.
Russian planners, by contrast, have shown a keen interest in the psychological makeup of their opponents. For example, Russian writings distinguish how to deter the "rational but timid" versus the "ideologically driven" adversary, or how to signal differently to a democracy versus an authoritarian regime. This conscious incorporation of cultural awareness in deterrence execution is itself a product of Russia’s own exposure to strategic culture theory. In effect, Russian strategists took Western deterrence theory, internalized and emulated it, and then tailored it to their needs.
There is more to the Russian approach to deterrence than simply copying and adapting Western theories. The personalities and institutional cultures that have dominated both Russian leadership and strategy are vital influences as well.
Since President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Russia's leadership culture emphasizes strength, resolve, and an element of tactical unpredictability - an approach that Putin's personal style of confrontational rhetoric and (seemingly) sudden moves like the annexation of Crimea personifies. It's a deterrence approach that banks on surprising an adversary and projecting willpower.
The Russian political elite often speak in the language of risk and sacrifice, which is culturally resonant for a populace raised on the history of surviving existential wars.
This top-level mentality filters down to strategy: for instance, the notion of "escalate to de-escalate" required a willingness at the highest level to contemplate nuclear first use. Putin and his advisors signaled that willingness (implicitly) to make NATO think twice about intervening in Ukraine. Whether that signal was a bluff or not, it had to be credible enough, and Russian leadership culture (steeped in a kind of machismo from both imperial and Soviet eras) helped make it so.
At the military institutional level, Russia inherited a tradition from the Soviet General Staff of rigorous analysis and planning for worst-case scenarios. This tends to produce elaborate deterrence frameworks (e.g. specifying exact damage levels to attempt at each stage of conflict) - if you're interested in more detailed information about the Russian strategy for escalation management I can highly recommend this blogpost by Michael Kofman on the subject.
The General Staff's culture also prizes what they call "integrated strategic operations" - combined arms, multi-domain actions - which dovetails with the concept of strategic deterrence as a holistic campaign rather than a mere threat. Additionally, the influence of the intelligence services (KGB / FSB / GRU / SVR / ..) has imbued Russian strategy with a penchant for covert or deniable actions as part of coercion. Thus, cultural factors like a secretive, chess-player mindset and the valorization of cunning ("khitrost" in Russian) in Russian military lore all contribute to how Russia executes deterrence.
They will, for example, place weapons in Kaliningrad or conduct anonymous cyber attacks to unnerve opponents while officially denying hostile intent - sending a deterrent message without a clear attributable provocation, a tactic reflecting intelligence-service ethos.
This example includes both of the two major areas where the Russian approach to deterrence differs to how the West goes about it - Moscow views deterrence as an "active" concept that ought to include actions rather than just threat, and it limits its deterrence to not just military means.
Another area is the nuance of intra-war deterrence, of escalation management. Russia has developed a fairly sophisticated doctrine for controlling escalation during an ongoing conflict (e.g. by demonstrative strikes), which arguably surpasses Western public doctrine in detail - simply because Western policy makers, particularly after the Cold War, had shifted attention away from nuclear strategy and deterrence; meanwhile, Russian military academics were vigorously debating "regional nuclear deterrence" vs "global deterrence", the role of strategic conventional weapons, and the evolution of damage-infliction concept.
For example, U.S. strategists were only beginning to re-examine deterrence vis-à-vis near-peers around 2014, whereas Russian scholars had already produced volumes on how to mix kinetic and non-kinetic measures to deter NATO's involvement in places like Ukraine.
The Russian way of deterrence draws on a rich tapestry of cultural influences, not just Western influences: the indelible imprint of historic invasions and hard-won survival; Soviet military-scientific concepts of deception and psychological control; a post-Soviet absorption of Western theoretical rigor; and a national strategic personality that prizes strength, patience, and if necessary ruthlessness.
These sources have combined to produce a deterrence approach that is decidedly Russian in style. It emphasizes inducing fear and uncertainty in adversaries, calibrating signals through action as much as words, and thinking several moves ahead in the, for lack of a better word, "game" of escalation.
By blending indigenous traditions with imported concepts, Russian strategists have crafted a coercion strategy that in some domains matches the West and in others is distinctively ahead (for instance, in the seamless integration of hybrid tactics). However, a strategy's value lies in its execution and outcome, which is what I want to look at in the next part.
Theory is one thing, practice is something entirely else
In the case of Russia, there appears to be a notable gap between theoretical formulation and practical execution of deterrence strategy, which even Russian analysts seem to acknowledge.
On one hand, Russian military thought has produced a robust and elaborate doctrine of strategic deterrence; on the other hand, the actual implementation of coercive policies has sometimes been inconsistent or plagued by unforeseen effects. One Western expert observing Russia comments that "theoretical development is a historical Russian strong suit - implementation less so". Something I can agree with.
Officially, Russian leaders tend to highlight the success of their deterrence measures. For instance, President Putin and his defense officials have pointed out that Russia's nuclear forces have prevented "direct aggression by NATO". I thought long and hard about a possibility of finding a wording to comment on that statement that wouldn't just be a stream of expletives.
After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin implicitly took credit for deterring the United States and its allies from intervening on Ukraine's side - citing the fact that NATO did not impose a no-fly zone or send troops, likely due in part to Russian nuclear saber-rattling. Indeed, Western policymakers openly admitted they sought to avoid "World War III" with Russia, indicating that Russian deterrent threats (like Putin's warning of "consequences never seen in history" if outsiders interfered) had some effect.
However, Russian practitioners must also recognize that their deterrence strategy did not fully achieve its aims. A primary Russian goal was to dissuade the West from arming Ukraine. In this, coercion only partially succeeded. Western military assistance to Ukraine, while cautious at first, grew into a massive pipeline of advanced weapons. By 2023, NATO states were supplying Ukraine with tanks, long-range firepower, and other heavy capabilities - steps that Russia had, quite desperately, tried to forestall with its threats.
Thus, an objective reading is that Russian coercive measures were partially successful at best, if not largely a failure in stopping Western support for Ukraine. Unfortunately I do not (yet) speak Russian, so I have to rely on other analysts to determine if this outcome is appreciated by Russian strategists as well.
I found one comment stating that it would be "ironic if Western analysts saw Russian 'strategic deterrence' measures as a coercion success story, while Moscow itself interpreted it as a failure relative to their actual goals". In other words, Russia may privately view its deterrence efforts in Ukraine as having fallen short - yes, NATO stayed out directly, but NATO's involvement by proxy (intelligence, training, and arms deliveries) was much greater than Russia wanted.
I would argue that, in a sense, both Russia and NATO mutually exercised restraint to avoid escalation into a broader war. Russia's coercion, combined with Western prudence, resulted in a tacit outcome - to the detriment of Ukraine - where the conflict was geographically contained (no horizontal escalation beyond Ukraine).
However there is evidence that, as the war dragged on, Russia felt its deterrent hold slipping - by 2023, Moscow resorted to additional measures like covert sabotage across Europe (for example fires and other sabotage actions) as asymmetric attempts to retaliate for increasing Western aid. If nuclear threats alone no longer impressed Western capitals (which started calling Russia's bluff to some extent, far too little and too late in my opinion), the Kremlin tried other levers (cyber, covert action) to restore a degree of deterrence by raising the costs and risks for Europe.
While, in a sense, escalating their actions to support deterrence, Moscow was also aware of the risks that came with the decision to do so. Russian military writings do sometimes explicitly acknowledge risks of unintended escalation. For example, Russian analysts are aware that using conventional precision strikes against an adversary's strategic targets (as part of "non-nuclear deterrence") during a kinetic conflict or sabotage actions in that somewhat gray area between peace and war could be misread by the opponent, potentially triggering escalation rather than defusing it.
There have been notable cases where Russian deterrence signaling either failed to achieve the desired effect or even backfired. A dramatic recent example is how Russia’s threats and aggression have led to the opposite of their intended outcome with regard to NATO's expansion. Putin long warned that if NATO expanded to include Finland and Sweden, Russia would view it as a grave threat and respond forcefully.
These warnings - part of Russia's deterrence by threat - were meant to dissuade those nations from joining NATO. However, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (justified in part by grievances over NATO), Finland and Sweden decided to seek NATO membership due to heightened fear of Russian aggression. In effect, Putin's war and coercive rhetoric backfired, causing exactly what he wanted to avoid. Moscow, of course, officially blamed NATO and denied that its own actions prompted this result.
This episode illustrates negative returns from Russian coercion: the use of force in Ukraine was intended to deter NATO's presence in the region; instead it motivated more countries to join NATO, thereby expanding the very threat Russia sought to avert.
In Finland's case, the Russian deterrent threat (implicit in its invasion of a non-NATO neighbor) was credible - Helsinki believed it - but it led not to compliance or neutrality, rather to counter-balancing. Historically, the Soviet Union saw similar effects: for instance, brutal repression of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 deterred those nations from leaving the Warsaw Pact, but fed into Western resolve to contain the USSR further.
Miscommunication is another worry. During the Cold War, there were cases like the 1983 Able Archer incident, when Soviet leadership nearly misinterpreted a NATO exercise as a real attack, bringing both sides close to nuclear alert. Such episodes underscore how easily deterrence can slip into dangerous misunderstanding. (If you are interested in a case study about the dangers of miscommunication and misunderstanding in deterrence, I can recommend this paper about the interactions between India and Pakistan by the King's College London.)
In present times, Russia's practice of high-risk signaling (e.g. flying nuclear-capable bombers near NATO airspace, or ambiguous statements by officials) could be misread by NATO as preparations for attack, potentially prompting NATO to escalate its readiness in response.
A far bigger worry from the Russian perspective is the possibility of their coercive signals being dismissed if they are used too often or without follow-through. In 2022, for instance, Moscow put its nuclear forces on a higher alert status and issued warnings, but notably did not take steps like mating warheads to aircraft or deploying tactical nukes to Ukraine. NATO intelligence reportedly saw no concrete nuclear preparations. Over time, Western analysts openly debated whether Russia truly would use a nuclear weapon, with some concluding the threats were hollow. If adversaries come to believe Russia is "self-deterred" (for fear of global backlash), then Russian deterrence by threat loses force.
Russian commentators like Sergey Karaganov (a prominent hawkish thinker) have even lamented that not acting on threats undermines Russia's aura of resolve. In mid-2023, Karaganov controversially argued that Russia might need to fire a "demonstration nuclear strike" to restore its deterrence credibility vis-à-vis the West - a stark illustration of worries that deterrence might be failing from under-use. It's important to note that this view is on the extreme end of the spectrum and not official state policy, but it circulates in Russian discourse.
Thus, we can infer that Moscow is keenly aware of the delicate balance between making threats strong enough to be believed but not so reckless as to cause uncontrolled escalation. They are walking a tightrope: pressuring adversaries intensely, yet trying to avoid crossing the adversary's ultimate red lines.
In order to manage this, Russia often employs what Adamsky calls "cumulative coercion", a steady drumbeat of low-level actions that over time build a deterrent effect without single actions that risk big escalation.
However, such a strategy can also generate "noise" that obscures real red lines. If everything is a threat, nothing is a threat. Opponents may grow habituated or confused by constant pressure. Western officials have sometimes expressed uncertainty about the question if Russia truly considers XYZ a red line or is it simply posturing?
Ambiguity can undermine deterrence if the adversary guesses wrong. Russian analysts are not blind to this; they study Western decision-making and media carefully to gauge how their messages are received. But, once more, miscommunication is always possible, especially across different strategic cultures.
To sum things up: While Russia's way of deterrence has indeed achieved some clear successes in recent years (e.g. deterring direct NATO intervention in Ukraine), practical implementation has repeatedly shown some fragility and side-effects.
Russian practitioners see that coercion can produce unintended consequences, like strengthening Western unity or prompting enemy actions that Russia sought to avoid. They have responded by adjusting tactics (clarifying doctrine here, escalating hybrid efforts there). Nonetheless, the risk of escalation control failure looms large. As one assessment warns, if a NATO-Russia conflict did erupt, both sides would find themselves unprepared for the complex escalation dynamics.
This reveals a certain sobering recognition: despite all the elaborate Russian planning, war remains a realm of great uncertainty, and deterrence signals do not always land as intended. Even within the Russian strategic community, some voices likely counsel caution about overconfidence in their deterrence model.
The gap between a robust theoretical formulation and the failure in the institutional ability to execute doctrine means that there is quite often a significant crevasse when between theory and practice of Russian deterrence.
An attempt at looking at the future
The war in Ukraine has undergone several phases, and is currently changing as well. What's going to happen, how things are going to develop, I - and we, in general - do not know. But Russia's deterrence theory and practice will undoubtedly adapt in response to the lessons Moscow learned during this conflict.
Assuming that the world will eventually enter a "post-Ukraine" era, this era will pose new challenges for Moscow's coercive strategy. NATO is more united and larger than ever before, Russia's conventional military has had its strengths revealed, but its weaknesses and vulnerabilities even more so. The global geopolitical dynamics are shifting.
Especially because of the diminished capabilities of conventional Russian forces, the trajectory is likely to be one of continuity in emphasis on deterrence, but also potential refinement. Deterrence will continue to remain a "main theme" of Russian strategy, a tool the Russian strategic community is likely to "double down". However, Russia may have to re-calibrate how it employs threats versus incentives, how it balances nuclear and non-nuclear elements, and how it communicates its red lines, based on what their full-scale invasion of Ukraine has revealed.
One of the major Russian efforts in the near future will likely be focused on restoring and enhancing the credibility of its deterrent after the rather mixed outcomes of the Ukraine conflict. This could take several forms.
On the nuclear front, Moscow may place even greater emphasis on modernizing its arsenal and showcasing new strategic systems, either in practice or by talking about plans they have. Putin has already highlighted "superweapons" like the Sarmat ICBM, Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, and Poseidon nuclear torpedos in recent years. Post-Ukraine, such systems (even if they aren't actually operational yet) will be used in messaging to assure the West that Russia retains overwhelming destructive power, in order to shore up deterrence even if Russian conventional forces appear tarnished. We might see more frequent nuclear force exercises and possibly a resumption of nuclear test rhetoric.
I'm doubtful that we will see actual nuclear testing again, but given the recklessness of Russian actions in these past few years I'm not willing to rule them out entirely either. Russia might calculate that occasional conspicuous displays of nuclear capability - within treaty bounds, or if arms control collapses altogether after the expiry of "New START" - will re-impose some level of caution in NATO.
Essentially, Russia will seek to avoid a situation where Western policymakers grow complacent about Russia's nuclear warnings. By keeping its nuclear forces highly visible and rhetorically foregrounded, Moscow will likely intend to ensure that any future crises (say, around the Baltic or Black Sea) automatically prompt Western deference to the risk of nuclear escalation.
Concurrently, Russia will likely try to invest in rebuilding its conventional military effectiveness, since the Ukraine war exposed its shortcomings in .. well, a lot of areas. Especially in general combat readiness, logistics and (to a lesser extent) technology. A more capable conventional force improves deterrence by denial - an area where the Russian attempt at projecting strength has not exactly worked well in the past few years.
Moscow isn't quite in the same position it has been after the fall of the Soviet Union, but the invasion of Ukraine has showed the world that the "mighty Russian bear" isn't all that incredibly mighty after all.
Russian military leaders have spoken about expanding the army, improving command-and-control, and incorporating combat lessons (for example, better electronic warfare and drone defenses) after Ukraine. If successful, these reforms would feed into a stronger conventional deterrent vis-à-vis NATO's forward presence. For example, a faster, better-coordinated Russian ground force in the western strategic direction could make NATO think twice about a clash in say, the Suwalki Gap or Baltics, by raising doubt about a quick victory.
Strengthening conventional deterrence also gives Russia more gradations on the escalation ladder - allowing it to threaten conventional punishment (like long-range precision strikes on critical infrastructure) more credibly in future standoffs, without having to immediately escalate towards the nuclear options.
However, the question remains to what extent Russia will be able to do that. The significant losses in trained and experienced personnel, equipment and strategically important infrastructure in combination with the economic situation might severely hamper Russian efforts. Which is why it's likely that the more visible changes in their approach to deterrence will be in the realm of information warfare.
The Ukraine conflict confirmed the importance of controlling the narrative and influencing foreign public opinion as part of deterrence. Russia had some successes - sustaining domestic support with propaganda, stoking some anti-war fatigue in Western societies - but also failures (it did not truly fracture Western unity or convince the majority of European countries to abandon Ukraine).
Moving forward, Russia may refine its information deterrence strategies (perhaps using more and more sophisticated offensive computer network operations, clandestine funding of divisive political movements in adversarial countries, and better tailored propaganda efforts) to deter Western populations from supporting long-term confrontation.
In effect, Russia might focus more on trying to coerce Western public opinion as well, rather than just decision- and policymakers. An example would be attempts at threatening Europe with energy crises or trying to incite migrant waves (as it has been accused of doing in Syria) to signal that continued opposition to Russia will bring domestic distress.
One of the challenges for Moscow is that Europe is weaning itself off energy dependency and has grown more experienced with and vigilant against disinformation. So Russian "hybrid deterrence" must become more innovative, in order to increase costs for those who oppose it, thereby deterring hostile policies without engaging in open military conflict.
Western analysts have already noted that as the war in Ukraine progressed, Russian sabotage and espionage expanded as means to deter further Western involvement by showing that Russia can and will strike back asymmetrically. This trend is likely to continue, essentially institutionalizing something I'd call "peacetime sub-threshold deterrence".
But it's not just Russia itself that will dictate changes to their own doctrinal approaches to deterrence, the massively changed geopolitical environment will affect them as much as any other nation.
Europe isn't the same it was a decade ago. NATO has enlarged and is in the process of rearming its eastern flank. The very adversary Russia seeks to deter has become more prepared and less naive about Russian threats - something that, in the past, has sometimes led to an escalation of deterrence signals to higher levels in order to achieve the same effect as before.
However, higher escalatory signals come with increased risk of crossing NATO's thresholds inadvertently. Managing this will be tricky. For instance, if Russia in a future crisis mobilizes 200.000 troops on a border (as it did before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine), NATO will not discount the threat like some of its members did in early 2022. They will assume that an attack is likely and respond by mobilizing as well.
That reduces the usefulness of mere mobilization as a coercive tool, because it could trigger a "mirror mobilization" that Russia does not actually want to confront. Therefore, Russia might be forced to turn to less overt ways of signaling, such as information operations or demonstrations of cyber capabilities - domains where showing capability does not automatically trigger a symmetric and / or kinetic response.
The diplomatic and economic blowback that Russia has suffered because of the war of aggression it decided to engage in are going to be a challenge as well. It's not just Moscow's military strength and economic power that has suffered, its soft power has been almost eradicated in Europe. This significant reduction of levers short of force to influence others will likely lead Russia to attempt to deepen their relationships with non-Western powers, China being at the top of the list.
Even if it might not ever be a formal alliance, a future joint deterrence signaling by Russia and China is not unthinkable, such as coordinated air patrols or naval exercises in order to deter the collective West by presenting a (sort of) united front of two nuclear-armed powers.
Still, the multipolar geopolitical context is an emerging factor. Russia's deterrence strategy will evolve not just around the bilateral dymanics between Moscow and NATO, but withing a triangle or polygon of great(ish)-power relations. This could even moderate Russian behavior in some cases (e.g. not wanting to alienate China with reckless nuclear moves) or embolden it in others (counting on diplomatic cover by Beijing for more aggressive moves in Europe).
However things will go, we can expect them to definitely go somewhere. The Russian strategic community is likely to continue to analyze recent events in order to update and enhance their theories. We can expect them to conduct internal military-academic studies dissecting the coercion aspects of the Ukraine war, asking things like "What deterrence measures worked?" or "What deterrence measures failed, and why?".
So .. what now?
Before I dive into the final part of this post I have to remind you that I'm a hobbyist. I'm a (mostly) technical person with an interest in the subjects covered in this post. Which means I have neither military experience nor an education in policymaking or have been formally trained in geopolitical analysis. The recommendations I will make in the following paragraphs are what I would consider to be sane and meaningful steps that would further "our" (as in "the West") chances of successfully dealing with and countering Russian deterrence. I have absolutely no idea if they make any sense and no way of verifying it either. I'm more than happy to hear from you if my ideas are even more questionable than usual.
Having spent the last few years studying (not in the academic sense, but in the "I lack both social capabilities as well as a social circle, so I spend most of my spare time reading things on the Internet and devouring books") Russian behavior in international spheres and various conflicts I noticed over and over how there seems to be a significant lack of knowledge and understanding about the fundamental differences in the approach Russia takes to both diplomacy and solving conflicts in wide parts of "the West", even among experts - with the very explicit exception of the Baltic states. For reasons that might be easy to guess they are very aware of what kind of actor Russia is on the international state.
"Dealing with Russia is like playing chess with a pigeon. We are trying to make moves while they already flipped all the pieces, shat on the board, and boasted about how they have won the game."
Acknowledge and Understand Russian Strategic Culture
Increased Cultural Literacy: Policymakers and military planners should invest in knowledge of Russian strategic culture - of the emphasis on cost imposition, reflexive control, calibrated escalation, and historical experiences of invasion. Failing to grasp how Russia uses deterrence at all levels (nuclear, conventional, hybrid) can lead to inaccurate threat assessments or overreaction.
Avoid Mirror-Imaging: As many Western deterrence models are rooted in rational-actor assumptions with limited cultural overlay, Western analysts should strive to interpret Russian signals in the context of Russian historical narratives, leadership style, and doctrinal language. For instance, ambiguous nuclear rhetoric may not always represent a genuine willingness to escalate, but rather a longstanding tactic to induce psychological restraint among adversaries.
Study Russian Messaging Channels: Because Russia often relies on a combination of official statements, state-controlled media, and sometimes clandestine channels to signal deterrent threats, intelligence agencies and other relevant entities should track these signals holistically rather than selectively. This includes following key Russian military journals, official decrees, public speeches by senior leadership, and social media narratives.
Strengthen Unity and Clarity Within Western Alliances
Unity of Communication: Russia's hybrid deterrence strategy often aims to exploit fault lines among Western states. A coherent NATO or EU response, with aligned messaging and coordinated defensive measures, can reduce Russia's ability to isolate or intimidate individual states.
Consistent Signaling: Western partners should agree on common deterrence "messages", especially regarding metaphorical red lines (e.g. attacks on NATO territory, use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons). Mixed messages, or statements that fluctuate rapidly, risk emboldening Russia to continue to probe for weak points. At the same time, any credible threat of retaliation or denial must be backed by credible, visible actions (exercises, deployments, ..).
Enhanced Credible Posture: Speaking of credible, a robust NATO forward presence - conventional as well as in other areas, such as "cyber forces" - in Eastern Europe can reassure allies and deter (further) Russian adventurism. Although Russia sees such deployments as threats and uses them to fulminate against "NATO aggression", a carefully scaled posture can reduce Moscow's temptation to use intimidation against neighboring states. Transparency and dialogue can mitigate Russia's fear of encirclement while still signaling that aggression will not go unchallenged.
Maintain Escalation Control Mechanisms
Open Communication Channels: I know that trying to communicate with Russia is an exercise in tolerating immense amounts of frustration. Moscow's emphasis on ambiguous and flexible escalation poses inherent risks of misinterpretation. Especially because of that, preserving lines of communication, such as military hotlines or diplomatic contacts, is essential to clarify intentions quickly in crises. Even if political relations are strained, these channels can avert inadvertent escalation.
Crisis Management Exercises: In an ideal world I would suggest that NATO and Russia should ideally conduct joint or at least parallel crisis-management exercises to practice de-escalation scenarios. I am aware of the sad reality that this isn't going happen for the foreseeable future, for a multitude of reasons - first and foremost the fact that Russia continues to engage in an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The next best thing would be for NATO itself to conduct crisis-management exercises that specifically deal with crisis involving Russia, in order to better understand Moscow's decision making, thresholds, and escalation triggers, thus reducing the likelihood of crossing "red lines" inadvertently.
Risk Reduction Centers: The re-establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers and arms control forums would help manage understanding - even in the face of the usual challenge that Russia tends to try to abuse those forums as much as possible. Nonetheless, continuing dialogues on strategic stability can mitigate the most catastrophic escalation possibilities.
Counter Coercion Attempts
Resilience Against Information Operations: Russia's deterrence toolkit includes disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, covert actions and a host of other tactics, techniques, and procedures. Building robust societal resilience (through means such as media literacy campaigns, improvement of cybersecurity structures, ..) reduces the effectiveness of such tactics. If adversaries do not succumb to panic or confusion, Russia's attempts at reflexive control become less potent.
Cyber Deterrence and Attribution: Quickly attributing cyber intrusions and imposing targeted, meaningful sanctions can raise the costs for Russian attacks. Clear and consistent responses to hacking limits Russia's capacity to operate below the threshold of war without consequences. Measures that are intended to impose costs might, in a proportional manner and within legal frameworks, even include retaliatory cyber measures.
Energy and Economic Diversification: Many states in Eastern Europe once heavily depended on Russian energy, a lot of Western European states still do to some extent. Moscow uses this as a leverage point to further their own interests. Diversifying energy sources, building strategic reserves, or mutual support mechanisms (such as EU-level energy-sharing accords) reduces Russia's capacity to coerce via energy supply cutoffs, or the threat of such.
Tailor Counter-Deterrence Measures
Tailored Deterrence by Denial and Punishment: Just as Russia customizes its deterrence strategies to specific adversaries, NATO and other stakeholders can respond with tailored mixes of denial and punishment. For instance, stationing advanced air-defense or anti-ship systems in strategically vulnerable areas denies Russia easy coercive options - while, at the same time, credible threats of economic sanctions or legal action against Russia's elites can signal punishment if provocations continue.
Demonstrative Resolve: Publicly highlighting alliances, deployments, and readiness can deter Russia from testing a state's "periphery". For example, multinational military exercises in Poland or the Baltics make visible the costs Russia would face if it attempted an incursion. Russia tends to respect displays of genuine military capability more than purely diplomatic condemnations. The Finnish Armed forces released an excellent (and to be honest, quite entertaining) video that's a prime example of demonstrative resolve a few years ago.
Precision in Defining Red Lines: To avoid confusion, Western policymakers should clearly and consistently define what actions would elicit a strong response. Vague statements that could embolden Russian calculations of limited aggression must be avoided. But, at the same time, it's important to remain flexible enough to not "paint oneself into a corner" if Russia probes via hybrid means falling short of overt invasion.
Sustain a (Proactive) Diplomatic Strategy
Dual-Track Approach: Maintain deterrence and defenses while leaving the door open for diplomacy. As mentioned before, Russia traditionally respects strength but also demands recognition as a major power. Offering structured dialogues on European security, or limited confidence-building measures, can ease tensions. Nonetheless, the West must be ready to walk away if Russia tries to use talks as a delay tactic.
Leverage International Institutions: While Moscow may dismiss some Western-dominated institutions, involvement of broader international bodies (UN Security Council, OSCE, ..) can strengthen and legitimize Western positions. Even if these forums have limited enforcement power on their own, they can help rally global opinion against Russian coercion and isolate them diplomatically.
Over-reliance: Over-reliance on purely hard-power approaches might reinforce Russian siege mentality. Parallel efforts to maintain channels with (the still existing rest of) Russian civil society, academia, or cultural groups could, in the long run, temper perceptions of Western hostility. This is definitely not a quick fix, and it is not even guaranteed to work in the long run. But it might gradually reshape the strategic cultural environments in which deterrence practices flourish.
Foster Strategic Adaption
Regular Policy Review: Because Russia's deterrence strategy is constantly evolving, especially given their experiences after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western strategies must also be reviewed and updated regularly to stay effective. Periodic assessments of Russian doctrinal shifts, training patterns, new weapons, and strategic statements will help identify and patch vulnerabilities before crises arise.
Scenario Planning and Wargaming: Conduct realistic wargames that incorporate Russia's hybrid, multi-domain deterrence. This helps policymakers and military leaders test assumptions about Russian intentions, signals, and escalation thresholds. Learning from these exercises can refine both political and operational responses.
Investment in Technology and Innovation: Keep pace with Russian advances. A credible deterrent posture is not static. It depends on continuous innovation to address emerging threats. Western nations should continue to collaborate on research and development to avoid falling behind in next-generation capabilities.
Conclusion aka "finally at the end"
For reasons that would easily warrant another post of this length, and far more than that, Russia is an aggressor on the international stage. Appeasement won't work, diplomacy will be facing a tough battle when trying to achieve something without giving Russia anything and everything they ask for - and without being backed by credible resolve on all (metaphorical and literal) fronts. The better we understand how the Russian establishment and the Russian leadership thinks, the better we are able to deal with them on a world stage.
Countering "Deterrence à la Russe" requires us to accept that they are thinking about and approaching things differently than we are, sometimes in ways that we would consider questionable, if not outright reprehensible. It also requires a clear-eyed understanding of Russia's strategic culture, prudent but firm displays of resolve, and robust defense and resilience measures - the latter in all parts and areas of our societies.
Crucially, avoiding misunderstanding through structured communication channels and not letting ourselves get sucked into arms control discussions that only benefit Moscow can help manage the inherent risks of brinkmanship. I had hoped that I would not have to see the re-militarization of Europe, but credible military levers will be a necessity, as will economic levers, in order to make diplomatic and informational outreach feasible. That way Western actors can effectively deny Moscow cheap coercive victories.
The ultimate objective was, is, and will continue to be to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, yes. But severely limiting the success of hybrid aggression and disincentivizing the type of escalatory behavior Moscow is prone to engaging in should become a much larger point of focus for the collective West.
In so doing, policymakers (and whoever else is involved in all of these efforts) strengthen the long-term stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Especially because we can be absolutely sure that other actors, China foremost among them, are closely watching.
If you're interested in diving deeper into the subject I discuss in this post, or into strategic culture in general I can recommend the following books wholeheartedly. They have helped me greatly at furthering my understanding and providing me with the knowledge base that allowed me to compile this article: